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 A matter of collective action: value share (preservation, and 
capture?) for transaction costs relief
 To prevent individualistic behavior (value destruction) in case of 
insolvency, creditors are treated in an equal stance way (pari
passu/par conditio creditorum). Exceptions to the general rule 
are justified on the grounds of incentives for creditors to scout 
the common debtor performance.
 Pareto optimality in a Kaldor-Hicks frame: when someone is 
worse-off must be compensated.
 But the efficiency/fairness rule is misled: how to measure the 
improvement/impairment [marginal conditions]?
2. THE GONE-CONCERN VS GOING-CONCERN DILEMMA
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 “Creditors should have a right to compensation where they do 
not receive at a minimum what they would have received in a 
liquidation of the firm under the applicable insolvency regime (no 
creditor worse off than in liquidation safeguard)” (2011 KA, para. 
5.2).
 BRD, BRR and Spanish Act 11/2015: “a winding up under normal 
insolvency proceedings”. [But an insolvency proceeding does not 
necessarily involve the insolvent firm’s liquidation, at least totally].
 “Resolution of an institution which maintains it as a going 
concern” (BRD, Recital 8). “A failing institution should be 
maintained through the use of resolution tools as a going 
concern” (BRD, Recital 46).
3. THE VALUATION METHODOLOGY PROBLEM
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 EC Delegated Regulations 2018/344 (Valuation 3: NCWO) and 2018/345
(Valuations 1&2).
 Valuation methods (“measurement basis”):
a) Hold value: for the assets to be retained
b) Disposal value: for the assets to be sold
c) Franchise value [going-concern value]:  “the NPV of cash flows that 
can reasonably be expected to result from the maintenance and 
renewal of assets and liabilities or businesses and includes the 
impact of any business opportunities, as relevant, including those 
stemming from the different resolution actions that are assessed by 
the valuer”
 Art. 11.4(2) 2018/345: franchise/hold value cannot be applied when the 
asset management vehicle, bridge institution and sale of business
resolution tools are enforced, even when they are conservation 
measures.
4. HIERARCHY OF LIABILITIES, ABSOLUTE PRIORITY
AND INCENTIVES
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 Absolute priority is given by EU resolution regime to banks’ counterparties 
(other banks) operation liabilities (repos) and deposits, but the 
unprivileged/non-protected stakeholders have no power/incentive to 
propose a deal (as they are written down up-front).
 Going-concern valuation is fully consistent with a dilution response for 
existing shareholders and subordinated creditors: they receive a 
provisional loss with an opportunity to be compensated throughout the 
entity’s restructuring process.
 Gone-concern valuation is a tit-for-tat response: unprivileged/non-
protected stakeholders get an up-front, non-recoupable loss.
 The preventive reaction by shareholders and subordinated creditors to 
no deal/no compensation outcome is a bank run on their side. This will 
only foster the entity’s meltdown.
5. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS AND CONJECTURES
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1. Bail-in resolution is a monetary destruction mechanism charging 
losses to banks’ liabilities holders instead of depositors or other 
financial entities.
2. Gone-concern valuation for non-protected security holders is 
absolutely inconsistent with a value-conservation action 
implemented by the legally defined resolution tools.
3. The entity’s value preserved by resolution accrues to those who 
purchase the entity’s assets and business, and to other banks 
and depositors.
4. EU banking resolution has nothing to do with banks’ insolvency. It 
is simply a way to control money supply and the number of 
operators in the industry.
